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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Melisa Renee Bates appeals from a judgment for second-degree murder. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The state charged Bates with first-degree murder for the heinous killing of 
her uncle. (R., pp. 28-29; PSI, p. 2.) Her appointed attorney made several 
motions on her behalf, including for bond reduction (R., pp. 18-19), to dismiss 
(R., pp. 56-57), to suppress (R., pp. 59-60), challenging the constitutionality of 
the statutory abolishment of the insanity defense (R., pp. 62-63), for a specific 
jury questionnaire (R., pp. 65-66), for change of venue (R., pp. 68-69), and for 
additional peremptory challenges (R., pp. 71-72). The district court denied most 
of the motions. (R., pp. 76-77, 81-84.) The district court also ordered mediation. 
(R., p. 85.) The mediation resulted in a plea agreement, and Bates pied guilty to 
second-degree murder. (R., pp. 86-93.) The case proceeded to sentencing, 
where the district court imposed a sentence of life with 30 years determinate. 
(R., pp. 99-107.) Bates filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 108-10.) 
The district court appointed the State Appellate Public Defender to represent 
Bates on appeal, but ordered that previously appointed trial counsel continue to 
represent Bates in the district court. (R., pp. 116-17.) 
About five months after entry of the judgment Bates sent the district court 
a handwritten document entitled, "Motion to withdraw guilty plea pursuant to 
Idaho criminal rule 33c." (Augmentation (verbatim) (hereinafter "Motion").) The 
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factual recitation for the motion (contained in a part labeled "Affidavit" but 
unsworn) stated: 
I was pursistantly forced in to signing I was tricked by only reading 
last page last Signing After just haven read a continue 2 second x 
Second day of meeting [unknown symbol] for a more time to come 
up with money for trial 
Not properly investigated Knowledge with held Knowledge of others 
confession and explanasion the Cover up 
Motion of new counsel 
(Motion (verbatim except added material in brackets).) Thereafter Bates' counsel 
filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. (Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty and 
Notice of Hearing (augmentation); 5/17/13 Tr., p. 4, L. 9 - p. 6, L. 10.) The 
district court denied the motion. (Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Withdraw 
Plea Of Guilty (augmentation) (hereinafter "Order"); 5/17/13 Tr., p. 9, L. 13 - p. 
10, L. 8.) 
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ISSUES 
Bates states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bates' motion for 
the appointment of new counsel to represent her in regard to 
her motion to withdraw her guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Bates' motion to withdraw her guilty plea? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a 
unified life sentence, with thirty years fixed, upon Ms. Bates 
following her plea of guilty to second degree murder? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. 
Bates' Rule 35 motion requesting leniency? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is Bates' claim that she made a motion for appointment of new counsel 
and that the motion was denied by the judge without basis in the record? 
2. Has Bates failed to show any error by the district court in denying Bates' 
motion to withdraw her guilty plea because the factual claims underlying 
that motion were false and Bates therefore did not establish manifest 
injustice? 




Bates' Claim That She Made A Motion For Appointment Of New Counsel That 
Was Denied By The Judge Is Without Basis In The Record 
A Introduction 
Bates asserts as an issue on appeal whether the district court erred "when 
it denied [her] motion for the appointment of new counsel." (Appellant's brief, p. 
3.) In her argument, however, she asserts the district court erred by not ordering 
her "to appear telephonically at the hearing on the motion to withdraw her guilty 
plea and ask her why she wanted appointment of substitute counsel." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) Bates' statement of the issue is false because there was 
never any motion seeking substitution of counsel, and certainly no ruling by the 
court on any such alleged motion. Bates' argument that the court should have 
conducted a sua sponte inquiry into a potential conflict, also raised for the first 
time on appeal, fails because she has shown neither constitutional error, clear 
error, nor prejudice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Absent a 
timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged error 
under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 
P.3d 961, 979 (2010). To show fundamental error the appellant must show that 
some action or inaction "(1) violates one or more of [her] unwaived constitutional 
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rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." Perry, 150 Idaho at 
228, 245 P .3d at 980. 
C. Bates Has Shown No Element Of A Claim Of Fundamental Error 
There "is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction 
proceedings." Murphy v. State,_ Idaho_,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 712695, 
at *5 (Idaho, Feb. 25, 2014) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 
(1991 ), and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987)). This includes 
post-judgment motions to withdraw guilty pleas. State v. Hartshorn, 149 Idaho 
454, 456-458, 235 P.3d 404, 406-08 (Ct. App. 2010) ("a post-judgment hearing 
upon a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not a critical stage for purposes of the 
Sixth Amendment"). Bates' claim of a constitutional right to counsel (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 4-5) is without legal merit. Bates' claim of fundamental error fails on the 
first prong of the test because she did not have a constitutional right at issue.1 
The claim fails on the second prong as well, because even if Bates had a 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel to pursue a post-judgment 
motion to withdraw her plea it is not clear from the record that the trial court knew 
1 The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that the duty to inquire attaches to a 
statutory right to counsel only where the right to counsel granted by statute is 
absolute, not discretionary. Murphy. 2014 WL at *6 (distinguishing Hall, 155 
Idaho at 616, 315 P.3d at 804). Because the statute controlling appointment of 
substitute counsel is discretionary, I.C. § 19-856 (court "may for good cause" 
appoint substitute counsel), there is also no statutory duty of inquiry. 
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or reasonably should have known that a particular conflict of interest existed. 
Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, _, 315 P.3d 798, 806-07 (2013). "[A]n inquiry is 
only required when the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a 
particular conflict exists, which is not to be confused with when the trial court is 
aware of a vague, unspecified possibility of a conflict." kl at 807 (internal 
citations and quotations omitted). In the instant case the record does not clearly 
establish a known or reasonably known particular conflict of interest. In fact, it 
may not even rise to the level of clearly showing a vague, unspecified possibility 
of a conflict. 
Bates' factual allegations underlying her motion to withdraw her plea were 
that she was "pursistantly" "forced" and "tricked" into signing something, that she 
was apparently pressured by the need to "come up with money for trial," and that 
the case against her was inadequately investigated. (Motion.) Bates' appellate 
counsel, with heroic understatement, acknowledges that the factual statements in 
the Motion "are somewhat unclear." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) None of these 
claims are obviously, or even reasonably, directed at her attorney, much less 
statements that demonstrate the district court reasonably should have known that 
her counsel had a conflict of interest. 
That Bates was accusing her attorney of coercing her plea or inadequately 
investigating (as opposed to some state agent or the mediator of the plea 
agreement) is even less likely when the rest of the record is considered. During 
the plea colloquy Bates told the district court that she had received no promises 
except those stated in the plea agreement and that she understood that 
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agreement. (4/4/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 17 - p. 9, L. 1 0; p. 14, L. 4 - p. 15, L. 6.) She 
asserted that she believed the state's investigation of the crime had been 
inadequate, but that she wished to enter the guilty plea nonetheless. (4/4/12 Tr., 
p. 15, L. 15 - p. 17, L. 23.) She expressed satisfaction with her counsel's 
performance in the case. (4/4/12 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 1-6.) The record thus shows that 
Bates had previously aimed allegations of inadequate investigation at the state. 
It is not likely that those same allegations raised in the context of the Motion were 
aimed at counsel. Likewise, claims of force and coercion from unknown sources 
cannot be simply ascribed to the same attorney in whose performance Bates 
expressed satisfaction at the plea colloquy, especially when the allegations of 
such behavior could just as easily be ascribed to state agents or the mediator. 
The record simply does not support Bates' appellate counsel's assumption that it 
was her attorney that Bates was accusing of improprieties regarding her guilty 
plea. 
Moreover, even if the accusations could be deemed to have been leveled 
at trial counsel they would not trigger the duty to inquire. In Hall, a filing directly 
claiming a "possible conflict of interest" resulting from consultations between 
former employees of the SAPD and trial counsel did not trigger the duty to inquire 
whether post-conviction counsel, also employees of the SAPD, had a conflict of 
interest because the filing was "vague" and provided "little to no information 
addressing a potential conflict." Hall, 315 P.3d at 807. Bates' factual claims 
underpinning the Motion are even more vague and provide even less reason to 
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believe that counsel had a conflict of interest.2 Rather than clearly showing error, 
as is required for a finding of fundamental error, the record affirmatively shows no 
error. 
Finally, there is no showing of prejudice. As stated above, Bates' 
statements at the plea colloquy belie any factual claim that her counsel "forced" 
or "tricked" her into signing any document relevant to the guilty plea or that she 
was blaming her counsel (as opposed to the state) for not conducting an 
adequate investigation. Bates has failed to show any likelihood that giving her 
the opportunity to explain the allegations in the Motion would result in a finding 
that defense counsel had a conflict of interest in pursuing the Motion. 
Bates has failed to show even a colorable claim that the district court 
reasonably should have known that a conflict of interest existed. She has utterly 
failed to show fundamental error. Her claim that the district court erred by not 
conducting an inquiry into a reasonably known conflict of interest is without merit 
and should be rejected. 
2 Bates' claim that the phrase "Motion of new counsel," which appears in the 
Motion, amounts to a motion for substitution of counsel (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6) 
is irrelevant, even if it had merit. Even assuming Bates wanted new counsel 
such would not create a conflict of interest for current counsel. Finally, 
undersigned counsel admits being completely mystified as to the grounds Bates 
relies on in asserting that the alleged conflict, which is never actually articulated 
in the brief, extends to the Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
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II. 
Bates Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying Bates' Motion To 
Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Bates filed a motion to withdraw her plea several months after entry of 
judgment. (Motion (augmentation).) The district court denied the motion. 
(Order (augmentation); 5/17/13 Tr., p. 9, L. 13 - p. 10, L. 8.) On appeal Bates 
contends the district court abused its discretion because she was not informed 
on the record that the sentence for second-degree murder is not less than 10 
years, her plea "was the product of coercion and fraud," and the prosecution had 
withheld exculpatory evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-11.) None of these 
assertions has merit. Although Bates was not informed of the 10-year minimum 
associated with the offense on the record available to the Court, she never 
claimed ignorance of that fact or that she expected a sentence of less than 10 
years under the facts of this case. Her claim of coercion and fraud and 
withholding of exculpatory evidence are devoid of any factual basis. Bates has 
therefore failed to show the district court abused its discretion in concluding that 
Bates failed to show manifest injustice. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
determining whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion, as 
distinguished from arbitrary action. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 
51, 53 (1993); State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281,284 (1990); 
State v. Jackson, 96 Idaho 584, 587, 532 P.2d 926, 929 (1975). On appeal from 
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the denial of a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate 
court examines the entire record to determine whether it is manifestly unjust to 
preclude the defendant from withdrawing a guilty plea. State v. Banuelos, 124 
Idaho 569, 574, 861 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Ct. App. 1993). 
C. Bates Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
By Finding No Manifest Injustice In Allowing The Guilty Plea To Stand 
Generally, a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea will not be granted after 
sentencing. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295,298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); 
Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). A court 
may permit a defendant to withdraw her guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 
satisfactory showing by the defendant that withdrawal of the guilty plea is 
necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." I.C.R. 33(c). The strictness of the 
standard is justified by the legal weight of the guilty plea. "A plea of guilty has the 
same force and effect as a judgment rendered after a full trial on the merits." 
Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 346, 647 P.2d 796, 802 (Ct. App. 1982). The 
stricter standard also insures that the defendant is not "encouraged to plead 
guilty to test the weight of potential punishment and withdraw the plea if the 
sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333, 208 P.3d 
734, 737 (Ct. App. 2009). The defendant has the burden of proving that the plea 
should be withdrawn. kL State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178, 857 P.2d 656, 
657 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Bates failed to carry her burden of showing that the plea should be 
withdrawn on the basis of manifest injustice. Although her claim that she was not 
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informed on the record that second-degree murder carries a minimum sentence 
of 10 years has factual merit (compare I.C. § 18-4004 (second-degree murder 
punishable by "imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and ... may extend to 
life") with 4/4/12 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-3 ("This offense is punishable by up to life in 
prison .... ")), she failed to show how this omission resulted in manifest injustice. 
"Not all Rule 11 violations invalidate a guilty plea." State v. Thomas, 154 
Idaho 305, 308, 297 P.3d 268, 271 (Ct. App. 2013). In that case a misstatement 
of the maximum sentence in a plea colloquy was not manifest injustice where the 
court in fact imposed a sentence within the range actually articulated. ~ Such 
an error is harmless "unless the defendant can demonstrate, for example, that 
the misinformation at the Rule 11 hearing led the defendant to expect a lesser 
penalty than he actually received." ~ The Court held: 
when a judge understates the maximum sentence during a plea 
colloquy, and later sentences the defendant within the range of 
punishment described during the colloquy, such error is subject to 
harmless error review. When a defendant attempts to withdraw his 
plea in such a case after the sentence has been imposed, the 
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that although he 
received no greater sentence than was explained to him during the 
plea colloquy, he was prejudiced to such an extent that manifest 
injustice will occur unless he is permitted to withdraw his plea. 
Id. The claim of manifest injustice was rejected in that case because the 
defendant "has not even alleged that he would not have pleaded guilty had he 
been correctly informed about the maximum sentence he faced, nor presented 




Likewise in this case, Bates has not demonstrated, or even claimed, that 
she did not in fact know that the actual sentence range was 10 years to life; that 
she would not have pied guilty had she been informed that the sentence could 
not be less than 10 years; or that she had any expectation that the sentence 
would be less than 10 years. The plea agreement, in addition to reducing the 
charge from first-degree murder, provided that the prosecution would be asking 
for an indeterminate life sentence. (R., pp. 90-91.) The defense was free to ask 
for "any sentence available by law." (Id.) The defense ultimately requested an 
indeterminate sentence of unspecified duration but less than life. (5/24/12 Tr., p. 
73, Ls. 3-7.) Under the facts of this case there was neither a realistic expectation 
of a sentence totaling less than 10 years nor evidence of an unrealistic 
expectation of such a sentence. As such, Bates failed to show that the lack of a 
statement of the minimum sentence on the record that allowing the guilty plea to 
stand would result in manifest injustice. 
Bates also asserts that she entered her guilty plea because of coercion 
and fraud and that the state withheld exculpatory evidence. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 9-11.) Although Bates asserted coercion and fraud in her Motion, she never 
presented any evidence to support this allegation. Her claim she presented an 
"affidavit" on this claim (Appellant's brief, p. 9) is false because the handwritten 
statement in her Motion is not an "affidavit" under any definition of that word. 
Likewise, her appellate argument that the state withheld exculpatory evidence 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11) is outright frivolous. Even had Bates supported her 
allegations of fraud and coercion and withholding of exculpatory evidence with an 
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actual affidavit, the court was not required to accept such factual allegations 
because they were contradicted by the plea colloquy. (See supra.) 
Although Bates has demonstrated an error in the district judge's statement 
of the penalty for second-degree murder, such error was harmless and therefore 
did not rise to the level of manifest injustice. Bates' other claims are factually 
meritless. Bates has therefore failed to show any abuse of discretion by the 
district court in concluding no manifest injustice would result absent withdrawal of 
the guilty plea. 
111. 
Bates Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
The district court imposed a sentence of life with 30 years determinate. 
(R., pp. 99-107; 5/24/12 Tr., p. 79, Ls. 3-10.) The district court also denied 
Bates' motion for reduction of sentence. (Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Reduce Sentence (augmentation).) Bates contends that the fixed portion of her 
sentence should be reduced to "the range of ten to fifteen years" which would 
allow her to "get reintegrated into the community" "[i]f she is stabilized." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13.) Bates has failed to show that the district court 
abused its discretion in determining the risk Bates presents to the community. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The Court reviews the length of a sentence for an abuse of discretion, 
considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 
170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). The Court conducts an independent review of the 
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record based on the information known to the sentencing court at the time the 
sentence was imposed. kL "A sentence is reasonable if at the time of imposition 
it appears necessary to achieve 'the primary objective of protecting society and 
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution 
applicable to the given case."' kL at 726-27, 170 P.3d at 391-92 (quoting State 
v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836, 11 P.3d 27, 32 (2000)). The burden is on the 
defendant to show the sentence is unreasonable. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 
654, 660, 978 P.2d 214, 220 (1999). 
C. Bates Has Failed To Show That The Sentence Is Unreasonable 
The district court found that Bates suffers from severe mental illness. 
(5/24/12 Tr., p. 73, L. 11 - p. 74, L. 19.) It found that she has a "good family" that 
"loves her and cares for her and wants to see that she does receive the 
treatment she needs." (5/24/12 Tr., p. 74, L. 19 - p. 75, L. 1.) The court also 
found Bates has "many good qualities." (5/24/12 Tr., p. 75, Ls. 2-9.) However, 
Bates murdered one of the members of her good family who was trying to help 
her receive the help that she needed. (5/24/12 Tr., p. 75, Ls. 10-18.) 
The district court applied the proper legal standard, emphasizing the 
primary goal of protecting the public but with rehabilitation being "a very 
important factor." (5/24/12 Tr., p. 75, L. 19 - p. 76, L. 21.) The court found that 
protection of the community required that Bates be in a secure setting and that 
progress on her mental illness such that she would no longer represent a 
significant threat would come only by prolonged and intense treatment, both of 
which militated in favor of "a longer sentence." (5/24/12 Tr., p. 76, L. 22 - p. 78, 
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L. 19.) Finally, the Court considered the seriousness of the crime, which it 
characterized as "a particularly gruesome murder." (5/24/12 Tr., p. 78, L. 20 - p. 
79, L. 2.) Considering all these factors, the district court concluded that a life 
sentence is "appropriate" and that 30 years fixed was "necessary" to "cover the 
goals of sentencing." (5/24/12 Tr., p. 79, Ls. 3-10.) 
Bates' argument that the district court could have addressed its concerns 
with a fixed portion of 10 to 15 years instead of 30 does not show an abuse of 
discretion. It ignores the seriousness of her crime, simply speculates that she 
might be "stabilized" (whatever that means) in less than 30 years, and assumes 
that if she is "stabilized" she will no longer be a risk to the community. As found 
by the district court, Bates was believed to be "stabilized" (the district court's 
actual words were "the professionals thought her treatment was successful") at 
the time of the "horrible homicide we're sentencing her for here today." (5/24/12 
Tr., p. 78, Ls. 1-7.) 
The district court specifically considered all the factors Bates thinks 
relevant on appeal, and some factors Bates does not specifically address. That 
Bates thinks society can be protected with a shorter fixed portion does not 
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 
P.3d 935, 941 (2011) ("In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not 




The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and 
sentence in this case. 
DATED this 3rd day of April, 20 4. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 3rd day of April, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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